CWBA Seeking Your Input on Three 2026 Colorado Ballot Measures Involving Minors

The Colorado Women's Bar Association published a whitepaper on three 2026 Colorado ballot measures, Propositions 133, 134, and 135, involving minors, as well as collegiate athletes. We encourage our members to comment below, discuss with other members, and reach out to the CWBA (Execdir@cwba.org) to express feedback on Propositions 133, 134, and 135.

Read the whitepaper in PDF version: CWBA Whitepaper 2026 Ballot Measures.pdf

Understanding Three 2026 Colorado Ballot Measures

A Whitepaper by the Colorado Women’s Bar Association

Purpose and Approach: Three measures on Colorado’s 2026 statewide ballot ask voters to change state law on subjects of deep public concern: the punishment of those who exploit children for sex, the designation of school and college sports teams by sex, and surgical care for transgender minors. The measures – Propositions 133, 134, and 135 – were filed as citizen initiatives and sponsored by Protect Kids Colorado, an organization which seeks “to mobilize the people of Colorado and the Church to engage with biblical and biological truth.” All three will be decided by the same electorate on the same ballot. The Colorado Women’s Bar Association (“CWBA”) offers this paper as a neutral legal resource. For each measure, it explains in plain terms: what the measure would do, what Colorado law currently provides, and the open legal questions a court or the legislature may later have to resolve. Where a measure’s text leaves an important term undefined or a constitutional question unsettled, we say so. Our consistent concern across all three measures is the same one that guides the CWBA’s work generally: that laws affecting Coloradans be written with clear standards, fair procedures, and respect for constitutional rights.

Proposition 133 – Penalties for Human Trafficking of a Minor “Children Are Not For Sale Act”

What it would do: Proposition 133 would amend Colorado’s crime of human trafficking of a minor for sexual servitude (C.R.S. § 18-3-504(2)) in two ways. First, it would add a new, transaction-based way of committing the offense: knowingly trading anything of monetary value to buy or sell sexual activity with a minor. Second, it would reclassify every violation of that subsection from a class 2 felony to a class 1 felony punishable by life imprisonment without parole or release. An important point for voters: the life-without-parole penalty would not be limited to the new buyer-or-seller conduct. Because the reclassification applies to the whole subsection, it would also attach to the existing trafficking acts currently on the books — recruiting, harboring, transporting, isolating, providing, receiving, maintaining, and making a minor available. The measure preserves the Governor’s power to grant a pardon, commutation, or clemency. It would take effect January 1, 2027 and only apply to offenses committed on or after that date.

What current law provides: Human trafficking of a minor for sexual servitude is currently a class 2 felony, carrying a sentence of at least the minimum of the class 2 presumptive range — a baseline of 8 to 24 years. (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-504.) A crime-of-violence enhancement can raise the range to 16 to 48 years, but only when the additional facts are separately charged and proven; it is not automatic. Colorado currently punishes purchaser conduct. Effective July 1, 2026, C.R.S. § 18-7-406 (“Engaging in commercial sexual activity with a child”) is a class 3 felony. It is also a sex offense within Colorado’s lifetime-supervision framework — meaning it currently carries an indeterminate sentence that can extend to a person’s natural life, subject to parole review. The distinctive change under Proposition 133 is not that a life sentence becomes possible for purchaser conduct; it is that the new trafficking route would require life without parole or release.

Open legal questions:

• Overlap with the existing purchaser statute. The new “trades anything of monetary value” clause and § 18-7-406 may reach much of the same conduct, yet carry dramatically different sentences. Colorado’s Legislative Council and Office of Legislative Legal Services flagged this overlap during initiative review. Colorado’s equal-protection doctrine can be implicated when two statutes punish essentially identical conduct differently without a reasonable distinction. In People v. Maloy, 2020 COA 71, the court held that punishing patronizing a prostituted child more severely than an overlapping offense violated equal protection as applied to the defendant. The Colorado Supreme Court later distinguished Maloy in People v. Dominguez, 2026 CO 30M, while expressly declining to decide the underlying equal-protection merits, underscoring that the analysis depends on the particular statutory elements and facts.

• Undefined terms. The measure uses “sexual activity” (a term already defined in Colorado law) together with the new phrase “trades anything of monetary value,” rather than the existing defined term “commercial sexual activity,” and does not define “anything of monetary value.” Whether promises, services, or indirect exchanges qualify is left open — a question that carries more weight because the penalty is mandatory life without parole.

• Juvenile application. Under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the Eighth Amendment bars life without parole for a person who was under 18 when committing a nonhomicide offense. Trafficking is a nonhomicide offense, so a literal application of the measure’s no-parole command to a juvenile would conflict with controlling federal law. Colorado currently has parole provisions for certain juveniles convicted as adults of class 1 felonies; the measure does not say how those provisions interact with its “without parole or release” language.

• Adult sentencing. The measure is not automatically unconstitutional as applied to adults. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that imposing a life-without-parole sentence on an adult for felony murder was not categorically unconstitutional, applying proportionality principles under the Eighth Amendment and the Colorado Constitution. Sellers v. People, 2024 CO 64. And the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for possessing a large quantity of drugs — a nonhomicide offense — holding that neither the sentence’s mandatory nature nor the absence of individualized consideration of mitigating factors rendered it cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). Proposition 133 involves trafficking, a nonhomicide offense, so no decision forecloses an adult challenge, and the proportionality framework governs. Because the penalty is mandatory, a judge could not impose a term of years, which could invite as-applied proportionality challenges, particularly for a defendant whose role or culpability differs from that of a traditional trafficker.

• Trafficking survivors charged as defendants. A trafficking-specific affirmative defense (§ 18-3 504(2.5)) is not amended by the measure and remains available, but a broader minor-victim defense (§ 18-1-713) expressly excludes class 1 felonies and would no longer apply once the offense is reclassified. What Proposition 133 does not do: It does not resolve the overlap with the existing purchaser statute, define “anything of monetary value,” distinguish offenders by role or degree of culpability, create a juvenile sentencing exception, or appropriate funds for prevention, investigation, or survivor services. It is principally an offense definition and sentencing measure.

Proposition 134 – Male and Female Participation in School Sports “Protect Girls’ Sports Act”

What it would do: Proposition 134 would require every K-12 and collegiate interscholastic and intramural athletic program in Colorado to be designated by biological sex — as for men, for women, or coeducational. Teams designated for females could not be open to males, and teams designated for males could not be open to females unless no corresponding female team is offered in that sport. Enforcement runs through the state, not through individuals. Each school’s governing body must adopt an implementing policy; the Commissioner of Education is the enforcement authority; and remedial action is available only after the Commissioner finds a district has intentionally refused to comply and has allowed it a reasonable time to cure. The text contains no inspection process, no mechanism for challenging an individual student’s sex, and no verification test.

What current law provides: Colorado law currently protects transgender inclusion. The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, as interpreted by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission since 2013, requires schools to accommodate students consistent with their gender identity, including in sports. In practice, however, the picture is uneven: the Colorado High School Activities Association has stepped back from enforcement, some districts have adopted biological-sex-only policies, and in March 2026 the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights found that Jefferson County Public Schools violated Title IX. The result is a patchwork rather than a uniform statewide rule. Open legal questions:

• Federal law permits, but does not require, this approach. In West Virginia v. B.P.J., 146 S. Ct. 2356 (2026), (consolidated with the Idaho case Little v. Hecox), the Supreme Court held that a state may maintain girls’/women’s teams for biological females without violating Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause, treating safety and competitive fairness as important governmental interests to which limiting girls’ teams to biological females is substantially related under intermediate scrutiny. That ruling permits states to restrict participation but does not compel it. Colorado’s existing gender-identity protections thus remain in force unless changed by a measure like Proposition 134. Justice Sotomayor, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed with the majority’s approach.

• Scope and age. The measure reaches elementary-age programs, before the age at which the limited available data suggest performance differences associated with male puberty begin to emerge. On average, male puberty produces physiological changes — height, muscle mass, bone density, strength — that can affect athletic performance, though the degree of any advantage, and the effect of hormone therapy, varies by sport and limitedly studied.

• Implementation and privacy. The text leaves the form of “remedial action” to the Commissioner’s discretion and places policy adoption with each district. There is no inspection or challenge mechanism in the law, but the practical effect of requiring every team to be sex designated raises concerns about local pressure to scrutinize individual children. Reliable national data on transgender student-athletes are limited: an estimated 1.8% of high school students are transgender, and only about 12% of transgender girls and 14% of transgender boys play organized sports, compared with roughly 68% of all youth.

Proposition 135 – Prohibit Certain Surgeries on Minors “Protect Kids From Irreversible Sex-Change Surgery Act”

What it would do: Proposition 135 would prohibit surgeries on minors performed to alter the minor’s biological sex characteristics, and would bar the use of state or federal funds, Medicaid reimbursement, or insurance coverage for such surgeries. Notably, it is limited to surgical interventions: it would not prohibit puberty blockers, hormone therapy, counseling, or other non-surgical treatment for example.

What current law provides: Colorado has not enacted any ban on gender-affirming medical or surgical treatment for minors. Further, health insurance providers are prohibited from denying or limiting coverage for such treatment when a healthcare provider determines it is medically necessary.

Open legal questions:

• Equal protection. In U.S. v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495 (2025), the Supreme Court upheld Tennessee’s restrictions on certain gender-transition treatments for minors, holding that a law classifying by age and medical use does not classify on the basis of sex or transgender status and so does not trigger heightened scrutiny. That decision reduces the likelihood that a surgical-only prohibition would be struck down on federal equal-protection grounds.

• Undefined term — “surgery.” The measure prohibits “surgery” but does not define that term. It is unclear whether the ban reaches only genital surgeries, includes chest surgeries, or extends to reconstructive or ancillary procedures — creating compliance uncertainty for providers, inconsistent interpretation by licensing boards, and potential litigation. This kind of ambiguity is in tension with the goal of clear, transparent implementation.

• Missing exceptions and transition rules. The text does not appear to include exceptions for emergency or medically necessary procedures, or a grandfathering provision for minors already receiving care, on surgical waiting lists, or mid-treatment. Combined with the undefined term, this leaves providers, insurers, and families uncertain about what conduct is prohibited — a due process concern that supports clear implementing guidance and defined standards.

These measures share a common legal thread the CWBA encourages voters to consider: Each raises a question of precision and implementation independent of its policy goal. In each, an undefined term, an unaddressed constitutional interaction, or an open enforcement question is left for the courts or legislature to later resolve. A measure can have both a legitimate purpose and meaningful gaps in how its text will actually operate.

Whatever voters decide, the CWBA urges that any of these measures, if enacted, be implemented with clear legal standards, procedural safeguards, published compliance guidance, and respect for the constitutional rights and privacy of those affected – especially young people.